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1 Appendix
1.1 A Graphic Illustration of the Model's Demographics
Figure 1 displays the demographic structure of our overlapping generations model.
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Figure 1: Model Demographics.
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1.2 Denition of Stationary Equilibrium
We focus on a stationary equilibrium concept in which factor prices and age-wealth distri-
bution are constant over time. The collection of all of the agents' possible states is denoted
by x: An equilibrium is described as follows.
Denition 1 A stationary equilibrium is given by government tax rates, transfers, and
spending (l; s; a; b; xb; P (ey); G); an interest rate r and a wage rate w; value functions
V (x); allocations c(x), a0(x); and a constant distribution of people m(x), such that the
following conditions hold:
(i) Given government tax rates and transfers, the interest rate, the wage rate, and dened
benet policies, the functions V (x); c(x) and a0(x) solve the described maximization problem
for a household in state x.
(ii) m is the invariant distribution of households over the state variables for this econ-
omy.1
(iii) All markets clear.
C =
Z
cm(dx); K =
Z
am(dx); L =
Z
y m(dx);
C + (1 + n)K   (1  )K +G = F (K;L):
(iv) The price of each factor is equal to its marginal product.
r = F1(K;L)  ; w = F2(K;L):
(vi) The government budget constraints are balanced at each period.
G = ar
Z
am(dx)+ lwL+
Z
b(1  pt)It>9max(a0  xb; 0)m(dx)+ l
Z
It>9P (ey)m(dx);Z
It>9P (ey)m(dx) = swL:
1We normalize m so that m(X) = 1, which implies that m() is the fraction of people alive that are
in state .
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1.3 Earnings and Earnings Persistence Calibration
The transition matrix for Qy is:266666664
0:8239 0:1733 0:0027 0:000070
0:2171 0:6399 0:1428 0:000196
0:0067 0:2599 0:7332 0:000198
0:1117 0:0000 0:0794 0:808958
377777775
.
The transition matrix for Qyh is266666664
0:8272 0:1704 0:0024 0:0000000000
0:5748 0:4056 0:0196 0:0000000000
0:2890 0:6173 0:0937 0:0000000005
0:0001 0:0387 0:9599 0:0012647506
377777775
.
The transition matrices induce an initial distribution of earnings with probability masses
over the respective earnings levels, given by [64.76% 32.80 % 2.44% 0.00006595%].
Table 1 reports the percentage of earnings earned at selected percentiles as a fraction of
total earnings generated by the model and also displays the corresponding gures computed
from the 1992 SCF observed data for the adult population (calculated by [1], Table 7, p.
845). The model earnings process produces a cross-sectional earnings distribution that is
very close to that computed from the SCF data.
1.4 The Social Security Formula and Its Calibration
The Social Security benet P (ey) mimics the Old Age and Survivor Insurance component of
the Social Security system and is set as in this formula:
P (ey) = 0:9min(ey; 0:2) + 0:32max(0;min(ey; 1:24)  0:2)+ 0:15max(0;min(ey; 2:47); 1:24):
The bend points are expressed in terms of average earnings and the Social Security
earnings cap is eyc = 2:47. The marginal rates of Social Security benets are taken from [2].
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More specically, their formula applies to an economy with average earnings of one. The
bend points are multiplied by average earnings in our model economy to make the formula
consistent with our model economy.
1.5 The Calibration of the Exogenous Parameters in the Model
Table 2 reports the exogenous parameters that are not used to match any aspects of the
model-generated data.
1.6 Interpreting the Size of the Bequest Motive
To get a sense of the size of the bequest motive, consider a person who starts the period
with cash on hand x and dies for sure next period. The budget constraint for such a person
is given by a0 = (x  c), where a0 is savings. The estate net of taxes b is given by
b = a0 if a0 < xb
b = (1  b)(a0   xb) + xb; if a0  xb:
The rst-order condition for an interior solution implies that the marginal utility of
consumption today equals the appropriately discounted marginal utility of bequests and
solves the following problem.
For the case of net bequests in the utility function, the following maximization problem
applies
max c
1  1
1  + 1
"
(b+ 2)
1    1
#
with
b = a0 if a0 < xb and
b = (1  b)(a0   xb) + xb if a0  xb, which we can solve for b: First, consider the case in
which the a0 < xb; or in the case of gross bequests in the utility function, then we have
b = x f2
1+f
with f =
 
1(1  )
!  1

:
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Then consider the case in which a0  xb and bequests are net in the utility function to
obtain
b = (1 b)(x xb f2)+xb
1+f(1 b) :
Since bequests cannot be negative, the expression for b reveals that x has to be large
before the person will leave any bequests. If x is not suciently large, then c = x and the
solutions just derived do not apply. Assuming that x is in fact large enough, the marginal
propensity to bequeath out of an extra dollar today is
@
@x
(b) = 1
1+f
when the estate is below the exemption level, and is
@
@x
(b) = (1 b)
1+f(1 b) ; when the estate is above the exemption level.
For the case in which gross bequests enter the utility function, the following maximization
problem applies
max c
1  1
1  + 1
"
(x  c+ 2)1    1
#
:
Hence, we have
a0 = x f2
1+f
with f =
 
1(1  )
!  1

:
In a dynamic model, where the odds of dying in any given period are low, x should
be interpreted not as the total stock of wealth, but as its annuity or consumption value.
Regarding the point at which the bequest motive kicks in, take 2, divide it it by the income
normalization (which is now 0.2 yearly), and multiply it by $57,135 to express it in year 2000
dollars.
1.7 Tax Incidence in the Benchmark Economy
To evaluate the distribution of the tax burden and to better understand how tax reforms
change it, Tables 3 and 4 report some gures corresponding to people who are, for example,
at the top 1%, 1-5%, and so on of the wealth distribution. First, we report the average age
in each wealth quantile; because age is an important variable aecting earnings and capital
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accumulation, looking at average age helps us to understand the mechanisms behind a given
tax burden. Second, in Table 3, we report the fraction of the total revenue from a given
tax that is paid by the wealthiest in a given group. Table 3 shows that the wealthiest 1%
of people are on average 64.3 years old, hence many of them are retired, and that they pay
35.8% of the total amount of capital income taxes in the economy. Given their age, they
only pay 7.7% of the total labor income taxes. Given the high estate taxation threshold that
we calibrate, the wealthiest pay 98.8% of the estate taxes and, nally, they pay 15.7% of the
total taxes in our economy.
These numbers are interesting also because they indicate that, should we reduce estate
taxation and raise earnings taxes to make up for the lost revenue, very little of the earnings
tax increase would come from the pockets of the wealthiest. Since some households can
become richer because of large labor earnings, as in [1] (and in the data), this is not a
foregone conclusion, as they would be faced with a higher tax rate on very large earnings.
The second line of data in this table reports the corresponding gures for households who
belong to the wealthiest 1-5%. The households in this group are slightly younger, they pay
a much lower, but still large fraction of total capital taxes (18.1%), a very similar fraction
of labor income tax, but close to none of the estate taxes because they are younger and less
likely to die but also because they are more likely to leave estates smaller than the estate
exemption level. The top 5-10% wealthiest households are quite similar to the latter group
in terms of the tax burden.
Table 4 looks at the tax burden from a dierent angle and reports the average amount of
a given tax paid by a group, as a fraction of average income in our economy. The rst line
of data in this table shows that every year, on average, the wealthiest 1% pay an amount
of capital income taxes that corresponds to 1.7 times average income, they also pay 1.3
times the average income in labor income taxes, and their estates pay, on average, 0.4 times
average income in estate taxes. Scrolling down to the wealthiest 1-5%, we nd that their
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average tax burden is much lower across the board and totals 0.5 times average income in
the economy. The wealthiest 5-10% pay 0.4 times average income in total taxes every year.
The last line of data in the table shows the average tax burden of taxation in our benchmark
economy. The average person is 51 years old and pays 0.1 times average income in capital
taxes, 0.2 times average income in labor taxes, almost no estate taxes, and faces an average
tax burden of 21% of average income in the economy.
These numbers also conrm and quantify the expectation that the burden of the labor
income tax is more evenly distributed than the capital income tax, while the burden of the
estate tax is the most unevenly distributed, with the top 1% paying 99% of the total taxes.
1.8 Distribution of the Tax Burden Eects When the Estate Tax Changes
We now report the tax burdens in the economy with a 55% tax rate on estates, an estate
exemption level of $675; 000 (which corresponds to the the levels of statutory taxation in
place in 2000), and a decreased capital income or labor income tax. All results are reported
for the model with bequests net of taxes in the utility function. The tax burdens for the
case of gross bequests in the utility function are very similar.
Table 5 reports the average amount of tax paid by a group in this economy with higher
estate taxation and can be compared to Table 4, which refers to our benchmark economy.
The biggest eect is that, due to a higher estate tax rate and a lower exemption level, the
estate tax revenue on the estates left by the decedents in the richest 1% increases from 0:4
to 1:0 times average income, almost tripling. In contrast, the estate tax burden of everyone
below the richest 1%, despite the lower estate tax exemption level, changes very little, due
to the fact that very few people below the top 1% leave estates of taxable size. The second
noticeable feature is that when the capital income tax is lowered, the average capital income
tax for the richest 1% goes down from 1.7 to 1.4 times average income. Lastly, for this
reform, despite the break coming from reduced capital income taxation, the average tax
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burden for the richest 1% is 3.4 times average income in the benchmark economy, but goes
up to 3.7 times average income when the capital income tax is lowered and up to 3.8 times
when labor income taxation is lowered, due to the fact that the richest save more and thus
benet more from reduced capital income taxation.
1.9 Policy Results When Changing the Labor Income Tax
Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 report the results for the case in which the labor income tax is adjusted
to balance the government budget constraint when changing the estate tax.
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Percentile (%)
Gini 1 5 20 40 60 80
SCF 0.63 14.76 31.13 61.39 84.72 97.21 100.00
All models 0.62 14.64 31.93 62.45 84.05 93.00 100.00
Table 1: Percentage of earnings in the top percentiles.
Parameters Value
Demographics n annual population growth 1.2%
pt survival probability see text
Preferences  risk aversion coecient 1:5
Labor earnings t age-eciency prole see text
 labor earnings levels see text
Qy labor earnings transition matrix see text
h AR(1) coef. of prod. inheritance process 0:40
2h innovation of prod. inheritance process 0:37
Production  capital income share 0:36
 depreciation 6:0%
Government policy a capital income tax 20%
P (ey) Social Security benet see text
s Social Security tax 12.0%
Table 2: Exogenous parameters used in the benchmark model.
Wealth Percentile Age Capital tax Labor tax Estate Tax Total tax
0-1% 64.26 35.79 7.74 98.84 15.65
1-5% 61.80 18.14 7.66 1.16 9.86
5-10% 59.18 14.94 8.87 0.00 10.05
Table 3: Percentage of the total for a given tax paid by a selected wealth percentile.
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Wealth Percentile Age Capital tax Labor tax Estate tax Total tax
0-1% 64.26 1.69 1.26 0.395 3.35
1-5% 61.80 0.21 0.31 0.001 0.53
5-10% 59.18 0.14 0.29 0.000 0.43
average 50.70 0.05 0.16 0.004 0.21
Table 4: Average amount of a given tax paid by a group, as a fraction of average income in our
economy.
Wealth Percentile Age Capital tax Labor tax Estate tax Total tax
Changing the capital income tax
0-1% 64.52 1.39 1.25 1.034 3.67
1-5% 61.70 0.19 0.31 0.006 0.51
5-10% 60.20 0.13 0.28 0.000 0.40
average 50.70 0.04 0.16 0.011 0.21
Changing the labor income tax
0-1% 64.36 1.60 1.21 1.020 3.83
1-5% 61.79 0.22 0.30 0.006 0.52
5-10% 59.67 0.15 0.28 0.000 0.42
average 50.70 0.05 0.16 0.010 0.21
Table 5: Tax burden (average amount of tax paid by each group, as a fraction of average income in
our economy) eects of changing the estate tax rate and exemption level to the year 2000 statutory
levels (the estate tax rate is raised to 55% and its exemption level is lowered to $675K).
b exb l K Y B K/Y B/Y r wage
Net bequest model, changing the estate tax rate
0.00 { 0.200 3.148 1.006 0.00887 3.130 0.882 5.531 0.492
0.21 756K 0.192 3.100 1.000 0.00880 3.102 0.880 5.622 0.489
0.40 756K 0.189 3.061 0.996 0.00887 3.075 0.891 5.697 0.487
0.60 756K 0.185 3.039 0.993 0.00899 3.061 0.905 5.741 0.486
Net bequest model, changing the estate tax exemption level
0.21 219K 0.191 3.085 0.998 0.00888 3.090 0.890 5.651 0.488
0.21 756K 0.192 3.100 1.000 0.00880 3.102 0.880 5.622 0.489
0.21 1095K 0.192 3.103 1.000 0.00879 3.102 0.879 5.617 0.489
Net bequest model, changing both the estate tax rate and the exemption level
0.55 675K 0.186 3.040 0.993 0.00897 3.061 0.903 5.739 0.486
Gross bequest model, changing the estate tax rate and exemption level
0.55 675K 0.187 3.023 0.991 0.00868 3.050 0.876 5.774 0.485
Table 6: Aggregate eects of changing the estate tax rate or exemption level, adjusting the labor
income tax. The lines in bold refer to our benchmark economy.
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Percentile (%)
b exb a Gini 1 5 20 40
Net bequest model, change the estate tax rate
0.00 { 0.196 0.811 36.92 53.32 67.22 83.54
0.21 756K 0.192 0.804 35.15 51.90 66.09 82.89
0.40 756K 0.189 0.799 33.79 50.78 65.20 82.36
Net bequest model, change the estate tax exemption level
0.21 219K 0.191 0.805 35.51 52.24 66.39 82.92
0.21 756K 0.192 0.804 35.15 51.90 66.09 82.89
0.21 1095K 0.192 0.804 35.11 51.87 66.09 82.91
Net bequest model, change estate tax rate and exemption level
0.55 675K 0.186 0.795 33.02 50.11 64.64 81.99
Gross bequest model, change estate tax rate and exemption level
0.55 675K 0.187 0.794 32.52 49.78 64.41 81.84
Table 7: Distribution eects of changing the estate tax rate or exemption level, adjusting the labor
income tax. The lines in bold refer to our benchmark economy.
Moving to parent's earnings
Parent's earnings 1st 2nd 3rd
Benchmark
2nd 0.06 - -
3rd 5.59 5.43 -
4th 35.71 35.50 28.41
Net bequest model, changing labor tax
2nd 0.06 - -
3rd 5.53 5.38 -
4th 34.15 33.98 27.12
Gross bequest model, changing labor tax
2nd 0.06 - -
3rd 5.49 5.35 -
4th 34.05 33.88 27.05
Table 8: Importance of parental background eects (both bequests and human capital) of changing
the estate tax rate and exemption level to the year 2000 statutory levels (the estate tax rate is raised
to 55% and its exemption level is lowered to $675K). Asset compensation required for moving from
a parental background level to another, normalized as a fraction of average income.
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Moving to parent's earnings
Parent's earnings 1st 2nd 3rd
Benchmark
2nd 0.06 - -
3rd 0.57 0.42 -
4th 14.87 14.71 13.98
Net bequest model, changing labor tax
2nd 0.06 - -
3rd 0.56 0.41 -
4th 13.64 13.47 12.80
Gross bequest model, changing labor tax
2nd 0.06 - -
3rd 0.55 0.41 -
4th 13.66 13.49 12.82
Table 9: Importance of parental background eects (only bequests, no human capital) of changing
the estate tax rate and exemption level to the year 2000 statutory levels (the estate tax rate is raised
to 55% and its exemption level is lowered to $675K). Asset compensation required for moving from
a parental background level to another, normalized as a fraction of average income.
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